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Abstract
Preserving differential privacy has been well studied under
centralized setting. However, it’s very challenging to preserve
differential privacy under multiparty setting, especially for
the vertically partitioned case. In this work, we propose a
new framework for differential privacy preserving multiparty
learning in the vertically partitioned setting. Our core idea is
based on the functional mechanism that achieves differential
privacy of the released model by adding noise to the objective
function. We show the server can simply dissect the objective
function into single-party and cross-party sub-functions, and
allocate computation and perturbation of their polynomial co-
efficients to local parties. Our method needs only one round
of noise addition and secure aggregation. The released model
in our framework achieves the same utility as applying the
functional mechanism in the centralized setting. Evaluation
on real-world and synthetic datasets for linear and logistic re-
gressions shows the effectiveness of our proposed method.
Introduction
Rapid growth of model technology is largely driven by data.
In most industries, data exist in the form of isolated islands.
Federated learning is proposed to build machine learning
models based on distributed datasets across multiple par-
ties (McMahan et al. 2017; Yang et al. 2019). In particular,
vertically partitioned multiparty learning is applicable when
parties share the same record ID space but differ in feature
space, such as using user experience on the web to support
decisions on healthcare. Understandably, parties do not want
to share raw data or statistics due to privacy concerns. How
to build a global model through data barrier while preserving
local parties’ privacy is a challenging problem.
Differential privacy is a standard privacy preserving
scheme to achieve opt-out right of individuals (Dwork et al.
2006). In general, differential privacy guarantees the query
results or the released model cannot be exploited by attack-
ers to derive whether one particular record is present or
absent in the underlying dataset. Many mechanisms have
been proposed to achieve differential privacy (Dwork 2011;
McSherry and Talwar 2007; Chaudhuri, Monteleoni, and
Sarwate 2011; Nissim, Raskhodnikova, and Smith 2007).
For example, the classic Laplace mechanism injects random
noise into the released results such that the inclusion or ex-
clusion of a single record makes no statistical difference
(Dwork et al. 2006). For machine learning models, (Song,
Chaudhuri, and Sarwate 2013; Abadi et al. 2016) develop
methods of adding noise to gradients to preserve differential
privacy of training data. Functional mechanism (Zhang et
al. 2012), which adds noise to the objective function rather
than parameters of built models, has also been shown great
success in deep learning models (Phan et al. 2016).
Recently, several works propose to train privacy preserv-
ing models under decentralized settings. Research in (Shokri
and Shmatikov 2015) proposes a collaborative deep learn-
ing framework in which participants train independently and
share only subsets of updates of parameters under the hori-
zontally distributed setting. However, it is not applicable in
the vertically partitioned setting. This is because we cannot
partition the gradients based on features and each local party
needs to collect raw data of those features owned by other
parties, which requires extensive use of secure multiparty
computation to update gradients in each iteration.
There have been several research works on building pri-
vacy preserving models in the vertically partitioned setting.
Research in (Heinze-Deml, McWilliams, and Meinshausen
2017) develops a framework for private data sharing for
the purpose of statistical estimation. Each party communi-
cates perturbed random projections of their locally held fea-
tures to ensure differential privacy. However, the task fo-
cuses on the statistical estimation of coefficients rather than
releasing a jointly trained model in our context. Research in
(Lou and Cheung 2018) develops a distributed private block-
coordinate Frank-Wolfe algorithm under arbitrary sampling.
They design an active feature sharing scheme by utiliz-
ing private Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform to update lo-
cal partial gradients in a differentially private and commu-
nication efficient manner. However, the gradient perturba-
tion requires noise addition in each iteration, which is dif-
ficult to achieve good utility-privacy tradeoff, as shown in
our evaluation. In ensemble learning, research in (Yao et al.
2019) proposes to enhance privacy preserving logistic re-
gression by feature-wise partitioned stacking. The proposed
method is combined with hypothesis transfer learning to en-
able learning across different organizations. However, this
research does not really apply to vertical partitioned learn-
ing as the high-level model still needs to access all data to
construct meta-data set when training private logistic regres-
sion.
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In this work, we propose a new framework for differen-
tial privacy preserving multiparty learning in the vertically
partitioned setting. Our core idea is based on the functional
mechanism that achieves differential privacy of the released
model by adding noise to the objective function. In the
framework, we show the server can simply dissect the objec-
tive function into single-party and cross-party sub-functions
and rewrite them in the polynomial form. For the coefficients
in the polynomial form related to one single party, they can
be calculated by each party in a differentially private man-
ner. For those coefficients related to two or multiple parties,
we apply secure vector multiplication and then add noise be-
fore sending to server. The server then solves the perturbed
objective function in the server side and releases the private
model. Our method needs only one round of noise addition
and secure aggregation. Hence, both good privacy-utility
tradeoff and computational efficiency can be achieved. In
fact, the released model in our framework achieves the same
utility as applying the functional mechanism in the central-
ized setting. We evaluate our method on real-world and syn-
thetic datasets for linear and logistic regressions. The experi-
ment results show the effectiveness of our proposed method.
Preliminaries
In this section, we revisit how to achieve differential pri-
vacy in the centralized setting. Consider a dataset D with
n users. Each user’s information is a record ti = {xi, yi},
where xi is the user’s feature information and yi is the
user’s label. The total number of features is d. We assume
that xia ∈ [−1, 1] for a ∈ [1, d] and y ∈ [−1, 1] for lin-
ear regression or y ∈ {0, 1} for logistic regression. The
objective is to build a model yˆ = q(x; w) from D that
achieves differential privacy. To fit w, we have an objec-
tive function fD(w) =
∑n
i=1 f(ti; w) that takes ti and
w as input. The optimal model parameter is defined as:
w = arg min
w
∑n
i=1 f(ti; w). We use linear regression and
logistic regression as examples in this paper.
Differential Privacy
Differential privacy guarantees output of a query q be insen-
sitive to the presence or absence of one record in a dataset.
Differential privacy (Dwork et al. 2006). A mechanism
M satisfies ε-differential privacy, if for all neighboring
datasets D and D′ that differ in exactly one record and all
subsets Z ofM’s range:
Pr(M(D) ∈ Z) ≤ exp(ε) · Pr(M(D′) ∈ Z).
The parameter ε denotes the privacy budget (smaller values
indicate stronger privacy guarantee).
Global sensitivity (Dwork et al. 2006). Given a query
q: D → Rd, the global sensitivity ∆ is defined as ∆ =
maxD,D′ ||q(D)−q(D′)||1. The global sensitivity measures
the maximum possible change in q(D) when one record in
the dataset changes. The Laplace mechanism is a popular
method to achieve differential privacy. It adds identical in-
dependent noise into each output value of q(D).
Laplace mechanism (Dwork et al. 2006). Given a dataset
D and a query q, a mechanism M(D) = q(D) + η satis-
fies ε-differential privacy, where η is a random vector drawn
from Lap(∆ε )
1.
Alternately, adding Gaussian noise N(0, σ2) with σ cal-
ibrated to ∆ ln (1/δ)/ε, one can achieve (ε, δ)-differential
privacy, where δ > 0 gives relaxed differential privacy.
Functional Mechanism
Functional mechanism (Zhang et al. 2012) is a differentially
private method designed for optimization based models. It
achieves ε-differential privacy by injecting noise into the ob-
jective function and returns privacy preserving parameter w¯
that minimizes the perturbed objective function.
Because the objective function fD(w) is a complicated
function of w, the functional mechanism exploits the poly-
nomial representation of fD(w). The model parameter w is
a vector that contains d values w1, w2, · · · , wd. Let φ(w)
denote a product of w1, w2, · · · , wd, i.e., φ(w) = wc11 ·
wc22 · · ·wcdd for some c1, c2, · · · , cd ∈ N. Let Φj (j ∈ N)
denote the set of all products of w1, w2, · · · , wd with degree
j, i.e., Φj = {wc11 wc22 · · ·wcdd |
∑d
l=1 cl = j}. For example,
Φ1 = {w1, w2, · · · , wd}, and Φ2 = {wa ·wb|a, b ∈ [1, d]}.
Based on the Stone-Weierstrass Theorem (Rudin 1953),
any continuous and differentiable function can be ex-
pressed in the polynomial representation. Hence, the objec-
tive function fD(w) can be expressed as a polynomial of
w1, w2, · · · , wd, for some J ∈ N:
fD(w) =
n∑
i=1
J∑
j=0
∑
φ∈Φj
λφtiφ(w), (1)
where λφti ∈ R denotes the coefficient of φ(w).
Functional mechanism perturbs the objective function
fD(w) by injecting Laplace noise into its polynomial co-
efficients λ¯φ =
∑n
i=1 λφti + Lap(
∆f
ε ), where the global
sensitivity of fD(w) is ∆f = 2 max
t
∑J
j=1
∑
φ∈Φj ||λφt||1.
Then the model parameter w¯ is derived by minimizing the
perturbed function f¯D(w).
Application to linear regression. A linear regression on
D returns a prediction function yˆi = q(xi; w) = xTi w. The
objective function of linear regression is defined as:
fD(w) =
n∑
i=1
(yi − xTi w)2 =
n∑
i=1
(yi)
2
−
d∑
a=1
(2
n∑
i=1
yixia)wa +
∑
1≤a,b≤d
(
n∑
i=1
xiaxib)wa · wb.
(2)
We get the polynomial coefficients λφ0 =
n∑
i=1
(yi)
2, λwa =
−2
n∑
i=1
yixia, and λwa·wb =
∑
1≤a,b≤d
n∑
i=1
xiaxib. and then
addLap(∆fε ) to the coefficients, where the global sensitivity
of fD(w) for linear regression is ∆f = 2(1 + 2d+ d2).
1The Laplace distribution Lap(η|µ, σ) with mean µ and scale
σ has probability density function Lap(η|µ, σ) = 1
2σ
exp( |x−µ|
σ
).
Its variance is 2σ2. Note µ = 0 if not specified.
Application to logistic regression. A logistic regression
on D returns a function which predicts yˆi = 1 with proba-
bility yˆi = q(xi; w) = exp(xTi w)/(1 + exp(x
T
i w)). The
objective function of logistic regression is defined as:
fD(w) =
n∑
i=1
[
log(1 + exp(xTi w))− yixTi w
]
. (3)
As the polynomial form of Equation 3 contains terms with
unbounded degrees, to apply the functional mechanism, it
is rewritten as the approximate polynomial representation
based on Taylor expansion (Zhang et al. 2012):
fD(w) =
( n∑
i=1
2∑
j=0
f
(j)
1 (0)
j!
(
xTi w
)j )− ( n∑
i=1
yix
T
i
)
w,
(4)
where f1(·) = log(1 + exp(·)), J = 2. We get the polyno-
mial coefficients λwa =
n∑
i=1
( f(1)1 (0)
1! − yi
)
xia and λwa·wb =∑
1≤a,b≤d
n∑
i=1
f
(2)
1 (0)
2! xiaxib, and then add Lap(
∆f
ε ) to the co-
efficients, where the global sensitivity of fD(w) for logistic
regression is ∆f = d
2
4 + d.
Secure Share of Scalar Product
For privacy concerns, actual data shall be protected and
cannot be known to each party or the server. Research in
(Boneh, Goh, and Nissim 2005) proposes BGN “doubly
homomorphic” encryption algorithm which simultaneously
supports one multiplication and unlimited number of addi-
tion operations, i.e. BGN enables two parties to compute the
scalar product
n∑
i=1
xia · xib given the ciphertexts of two vec-
tors {x1a, x2a, . . . , xna} and {x1b, x2b, . . . , xnb}. Research
in (Yuan and Yu 2014) modifies BGN algorithm to split
the decryption capability among multiple participants for
collusion-resistance decryption. Each participant first en-
crypts its private data and then uploads the ciphertexts to
the server. The server then executes the operations over the
ciphertexts and returns the encrypted results to the partici-
pants. Each pair of participants jointly decrypts the actual
result. During this process, server learns no private data of a
participant even if they collude with all the rest participants.
Through offloading the computation tasks to the resource-
abundant cloud server, this scheme makes the computation
and communication complexity on each participant indepen-
dent to the number of participants.
Achieving Differential Privacy in Vertically
Partitioned Multiparty Learning
In this section, we propose a framework of achieving dif-
ferential privacy in vertically partitioned multiparty learning
based on functional mechanism.
Problem Statement
In the vertically partitioned multiparty setting, each user’s
information is held by K parties separately. Each party
Figure 1: The framework of achieving differential privacy
in vertically partitioned multiparty learning based on func-
tional mechanism. (1) Dissect f into sum of g and h; (2)
Collect λ¯kφ from each party Pk; (3) Secure vector multipli-
cation and collect λ¯k∗φ ; (4) Solve f¯ .
Pk owns a disjoint dataset Dk on feature set Xk, where
|Xk| = dk. Similarly, wk denotes subset of w correspond-
ing to Xk. Label Y is not shared by all parties. Without loss
of generality, we simply assume party P1 holds the label.
A server coordinatesK parties to build a multiparty learn-
ing model. The server is honest but curious. It aims to re-
lease a model trained from the whole dataset D and to en-
sure the released model satisfies ε-differential privacy re-
garding to D. The parties provide necessary information to
the server and help server to build the ε-differentially pri-
vate global model. But they do not trust the server or each
other in terms of sharing users’ private information from
their local datasets. Each party can share statistics in a dif-
ferentially private manner. If a computation involves at least
two parties, it is conducted by a secure multiparty computa-
tion. For party P1, it shares the label with other parties upon
request through secure multiparty computation. On top of
that, each party Pk cares about the level of differential pri-
vacy achieved regarding to its sub-datasetDk. In the training
process, the local party Pk achieves ε(k)-differential privacy,
where ε(k) is ideally a smaller privacy level than ε.
The goal is to reduce the amount of secure multiparty
computation and noise addition to the minimum while keep-
ing local information secure and private.
General Model Framework
We apply functional mechanism in vertically partitioned
multiparty learning. Functional mechanism does not inject
noise directly into the regression results, but ensures privacy
by perturbing objective function of the regression analysis.
The server only collects information of the objective func-
tion at the beginning. The objective function can be dis-
sected based on features, so computation and perturbation
of the coefficients can be allocated to local parties by local
feature sets. For some operations involving multiple parties,
the server conducts secure multiparty computation with the
parties. Once the perturbed coefficients are collected from
local parties, the server solves the perturbed objective func-
tion and releases the private model. Figure 1 illustrates our
proposed framework of functional mechanism in vertically
partitioned multiparty learning.
The procedure of the framework is shown as Algorithm
1.Overall, there are four steps:
(1) Server dissects objective function f into sum of single-
party sub-function g and cross-party sub-function h, set and
allocates the corresponding coefficients {λkφ}K , {λk∗φ }K for
each party Pk to compute (Line 1-2). We use λkφ,λ
k∗
φ to de-
note all the single-party coefficients from party Pk and all
the cross-party coefficients involving party Pk, respectively.
The server calculates the scale of noise needed to achieve
ε-differential privacy and informs the parties (Line 3).
(2) Each party Pk computes polynomial coefficients λkφ in
single-party sub-function g fromDk and sends noisy single-
party coefficients λ¯kφ to server (Line 6-8).
(3) For polynomial coefficients λk∗φ in cross-party sub-
function h, it involves data from Pk and P∗, such as
n∑
i=1
yix
k
ia, where yi is from party P1, and
∑
1≤a,b≤d
n∑
i=1
xkiax
l
ib,
where Xa ∈ Xk, Xb ∈ Xl. Note that λk∗φ is a scalar prod-
uct of two vectors from party Pk and P∗. All parties send
encrypted vectors of user information to server and receive
back the securely aggregated polynomial coefficients λk∗φ
following the secure vector multiplication method by (Yuan
and Yu 2014) (Line 11). The parties add Laplace noise to the
results and send λ¯k∗φ back to server (Line 12-13).
(4) Server receives all λ¯φ, solves noisy objective function f¯
and releases the differentially private model (Line 16-17).
Algorithm 1 Functional mechanism in vertically partitioned
multiparty learning (D, f , ε)
1: Set fD(w) by Equation 5. . Server
2: Allocate {λk}K , {λk∗}K to parties . Server
3: Set ∆f = 2 max
t
∑J
j=1
∑
φ∈Φj ||λφt||1 . Server
4: for each party Pk do
5: for each λkφ ∈ λkφ do
6: Compute λkφ =
∑n
i=1 λ
k
φti
. Party Pk
7: Set λ¯kφ = λ
k
φ + Lap(
∆f
ε ) . Party Pk
8: Send λ¯kφ to server . Party Pk
9: end for
10: for each λk∗φ ∈ λk∗φ do
11: Compute λk∗φ =
∑n
i=1 λ
k∗
φti
using secure vector
multiplication . Party Pk, P∗
12: Set λ¯k∗φ = λ
k∗
φ + Lap(
∆f
ε ) . Party Pk
13: Send λ¯k∗φ to server . Party Pk
14: end for
15: end for
16: Let f¯D(w) =
J∑
j=0
∑
φ∈Φj
[
λ¯kφφ(w
k) + λ¯k∗φ φ(w
k,w∗)
]
,
and compute w¯ = arg min
w
f¯D(w) . Server
17: Return w¯ . Server
Dissecting objective function. In our framework, we only
need one round of noise addition. The for-loop in Algorithm
1 (Lines 4-15) shows the noise addition and calculation of
different subpart/terms of the objective function, all of which
together accounts for one single round. In fact, we take ad-
vantage that the overall objective function can be dissected
into two parts based on features,
fD(w) =
K∑
k=1
gDk +
∑
1≤k,∗≤K
hDkD∗ , (5)
where gDk is the single-party sub-function, and hDkD∗
is the cross-party sub-function. g only involves data
in party Pk. h involves data in party Pk and at
least one other party. Similarly to fD(w) in Equa-
tion 1, g and h can also be expressed as polynomi-
als of w1, w2, · · · , wd, gDk =
∑J
j=0
∑
φ∈Φkj λ
k
φφ(w
k),
hDkD∗ =
∑J
j=0
∑
φ∈Φk∗j λ
k∗
φ φ(w
k,w∗), where each λkφ
denotes the single-party coefficient and each λk∗φ denotes the
cross-party coefficient. Note that φ(wk,w∗) can be first or-
der parameter wk that needs label from P1, second order
cross-party parameter wk ·wl or higher order parameter that
involves more than two parties. After dissecting the objec-
tive functions, there are two types polynomial coefficients
required for the server to obtain the overall objective func-
tion, i.e. single-party coefficients {λkφ}K and cross-party
coefficients {λk∗φ }K . Only Dk is required to compute λkφ.
Cross-party computation using Dk and D∗ is required to
compute λk∗φ . The server requests λ
k
φ from Pk and λ
k∗
φ from
Pk and P∗. Allocation of single-party and cross-party coef-
ficients is different to each party. It depends on the type of
model, the order of parameters and the availability of label.
Take linear regression for an example. The objec-
tive function of linear regression is as Equation 2. The
single-party sub-function for the label owner, party P1, is
gD1 =
n∑
i=1
(yi)
2 +
(
−2∑ni=1 yix1i T)w1 + n∑
i=1
(
x1i
)2 ◦
(w1)
2, thus λ1φ = {λ1φ0 ,λ1w1 ,λ1(w1)2}. The single-party
sub-function for each party Pk(k 6= 1) is gDk =
n∑
i=1
(
x1i
)2
, thus λkφ = {λk(wk)2}. The cross-party sub-
function is
∑
1≤k,∗≤K
hDkD∗ =
K∑
2=1
(
−2∑ni=1 yixki Twk)+∑
1≤k,l≤K
(
n∑
i=1
(xki · xli) ◦ (wk ·wl)
)
, thus {λk∗φ }K =
{λ1kwk ,λklwk·wl}K . The server sends the formula of coeffi-
cients to inform the parties what they need to compute. All
(1+d+d2) coefficients in Equation 2 are allocated as follow.
For λφ0 , it only needs party P1. For first order coefficients
λΦ1 , λ
1
w1 (of size d
1) from party P1 are single-party co-
efficients, and λ1kwk (of size d
k) for each party Pk(k 6= 1)
require communicated information between P1 and Pk be-
cause Pk does not own the label and need yi from P1. For
second order coefficients λΦ2 , all λ
k
(wk)2 (of size (d
1)
2) are
single-party coefficients for each party Pk, and λklwk·wl (of
size dk ·dl) require information from two parties to compute
coefficients of wk ·wl for each pair of Pk, Pl.
Collecting single-party and cross-party coefficients.
Before each party Pk provides necessary information to the
server, the server decides the scale of noise needed for the
model to satisfy ε-differential privacy regarding to the whole
dataset D based on simply the input space (dimension d and
range of xi, yi). To achieve ε-differential privacy, the func-
tional mechanism adds Lap(∆fε ) noise to the polynomial
coefficients of the objective function. The server calculates
the global sensitivity of objective function fD(w), and then
informs the parties the scale of noise that the parties need to
add when sending results to the server.
Lemma 1. The global sensitivity of fD(w) is:
∆f = 2 max
t
J∑
j=1
∑
φ∈Φj
||λφt||1. (6)
Because the sensitivity only considers the worst case in
the input space, the server can calculate the scale of noise
needed for global model without getting raw data from lo-
cal parties. After parties receive the coefficients they need to
compute and the amount of noise they need to add onto the
results, each party adds Laplace noise Lap(∆fε ) to both λ
k
φ
and λk∗φ , and then sends noisy coefficients λ¯
k
φ, λ¯
k∗
φ to server.
Secure vector multiplication. When cross-party commu-
nication is needed, parties will not share detail data unless
through secure multiparty computation methods. Because
each λk∗φ =
∑n
i=1 v
k
i · v∗i is a scalar product of two vec-
tors vk,v∗ from party Pk and P∗, the only secure operation
required to computeλk∗φ is scalar product of two vectors. We
use the secure multiparty computation scheme by (Yuan and
Yu 2014) to handle multiparty secure vector multiplication.
Each party sends the encrypted vector to server. The server
computes all scalar products without actually knowing infor-
mation in the vectors. The participating parties receive the
encrypted results back and jointly decrypt the actual results.
The server has zero-knowledge on the raw data during the
secure vector multiplication process. Then the parties add
Laplace noise Lap(∆fε ) to these cross-party coefficients and
send the noisy results to server.
The total number of operations of secure vector multipli-
cation is O(dJK), and it occurs one and only one round at
the beginning of our approach. For other approaches using
secure aggregation scheme to update gradients (Hardy et al.
2017), the number increases by at least a magnitude of the
number of iterations.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 satisfies ε-differential privacy re-
garding to D.
Proof. Assume D and D′ are two neighbouring datasets.
Without loss of generality, D and D′ differ in row tr and t′r.
∆f is calculated by Equation 6. We have
Pr{f¯(w)|D}
Pr{f¯(w)|D′} =
∏J
j=1
∏
φ∈Φj exp
(
ε
∣∣∣∣∑
ti∈D λφti−λ¯φ
∣∣∣∣
1
∆f
)
∏J
j=1
∏
φ∈Φj exp
( ε∣∣∣∣∑t′
i
∈D′ λφt′i
−λ¯φ
∣∣∣∣
1
∆f
)
≤
J∏
j=1
∏
φ∈Φj
exp
( ε
∆f
·
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
ti∈D
λφti −
∑
t′i∈D′
λφt′i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
)
=
J∏
j=1
∏
φ∈Φj
exp
( ε
∆f
· ∣∣∣∣λφtr − λφt′r ∣∣∣∣1)
= exp
( ε
∆f
·
J∑
j=1
∑
φ∈Φj
∣∣∣∣λφtr − λφt′r ∣∣∣∣1)
≤ exp
( ε
∆f
· 2 max
t
J∑
j=1
∑
φ∈Φj
||λφt||1
)
= exp(ε).
In Theorem 1, Algorithm 1 satisfies ε-differential pri-
vacy regarding D, which is the same as the centralized sce-
nario. In comparison to the centralized functional mecha-
nism, the proposed framework adds the same amount of
noise to achieve ε-differential privacy and uses secure vector
multiplication to achieve the same utility. In comparison to
the methods that add noise onto gradients for each iteration,
our framework only needs one round of noise addition and
one round of secure multiparty computation.
Claim 1. Algorithm 1 achieves the same utility under the
multiparty setting in comparison to the centralized setting.
The utility of Algorithm 1 does not change along with the
number of participating parties K.
Differential privacy for local parties. Each party Pk
cares about all the coefficients that involve Dk, i.e. λkφ in
g and λk∗φ in h.
Lemma 2. The sensitivity of fD(w) regarding to Dk is
∆kf = 2 max
t
J∑
j=1
∑
φ∈Φ(k)j
||λ(k)φt ||1, (7)
where λ(k)φ indicates either λ
k
φ or λ
k∗
φ .
The availability of label makes significant difference in
∆kf . Because party P1 owns the label and the label is granted
access to other parties, there are more cross-party coeffi-
cients for P1 than other parties, which increases ∆1f .
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 satisfies ε(k)-differential privacy
regarding to Dk, where ε(k) =
∆kf
∆f
ε.
Proof. Assume that Dk and Dk′ are two neighbouring
datasets. Without loss of generality, Dk and Dk′ differ in
row tr and t′r. ∆
k
f is calculated by Equation 7. We have
Table 1: Mean square error of linear regression on US and Brazil datasets under different privacy budgets ε (δ = 1n for DPFW)
Data ε non-private DPFW-C DPFW-2 FM
US
0.1
0.0044±0.0132
0.0912±0.0007 0.1286±0.0154 0.0101±0.0305
1 0.0905±0.0008 0.1334±0.0235 0.0087±0.0261
10 0.0903±0.0008 0.1329±0.0204 0.0086±0.0259
Brazil
0.1
0.0044±0.0132
0.0470±0.0007 0.1502±0.0921 0.0070±0.0230
1 0.0454±0.0007 0.1989±0.1390 0.0045±0.0136
10 0.0453±0.0006 0.2013±0.1469 0.0044±0.0132
Pr{f¯(w)|Dk}
Pr{f¯(w)|Dk′} =
J∏
j=1
∏
φ∈Φ(k)j
exp
(
ε
∣∣∣∣∑
ti∈Dk λ
(k)
φti
−λ¯(k)φ
∣∣∣∣
1
∆f
)
J∏
j=1
∏
φ∈Φ(k)j
exp
( ε∣∣∣∣∑
t′
i
∈Dk′ λ
(k)
φt′
i
−λ¯(k)φ
∣∣∣∣
1
∆f
)
≤ exp
( ε
∆f
· 2 max
t
J∑
j=1
∑
φ∈Φ(k)j
||λ(k)φt ||1
)
= exp(
∆kf
∆f
ε).
To build an ε-differential privacy global model, the local
party Pk can achieve ε(k)-differential privacy, where ε(k) =
∆kf
∆f
ε < ε, which means stronger privacy guarantee.
Again, take linear regression for an example. To achieve
ε-differential privacy regarding to D, functional mecha-
nism adds Lap(∆fε ) noise to polynomial coefficients. The
global sensitivity of fD(w) regarding to D is ∆f = 2(1 +
2d + d2). Party P1 cares about λ1φ0 ,λ
1
w1 ,λ
1k
wk ,λ
1
(w1)2 and
λ1kw1·wk(k 6= 1). So the sensitivity of fD(w) regarding to
D1 is ∆1f = 2(1+2d
1 +2(d− d1)+(d1)2 +d1(d− d1)) =
2(1+2d+d1d). For party P1, Algorithm 1 achieves (
∆1f
∆f
ε)-
differential privacy regarding to D1. Party Pk(k 6= 1)
cares about λ1kwk ,λ
k
(wk)2 and λ
kl
wk·wl . So the sensitivity of
fD(w) regarding to Dk(k 6= 1) is ∆kf = 2(2dk + (dk)
2
+
dk(d− dk)) = 2(2dk + dkd). For party Pk(k 6= 1), Algo-
rithm 1 achieves (
∆kf
∆f
ε)-differential privacy regarding toDk.
The interesting observation is that: when party P1 shares la-
bel with other parties, P1 has 4(d − d1) more sensitivity.
∆kf for other parties does not change as the label |y| ≤ 1.
Thus, cross-party communication only costs P1 extra sen-
sitivity. By sharing the label, party P1 achieves relatively
weaker privacy in comparison to other parties.
Application to Logistic Regression
For logistic regression, to achieve ε-differential privacy, the
functional mechanism adds Lap(∆fε ) noise to the polyno-
mial coefficients in Equation 4. More specifically, λΦ1 con-
tains λ1w1 =
n∑
i=1
( f(1)1 (0)
1! − yi
)
x1i from P1 and λ
1k
wk =
n∑
i=1
( f(1)1 (0)
1! − yi
)
xki where Pk(k 6= 1) does not own the la-
bel and need ( f
(1)
1 (0)
1! −yi) from P1. λΦ2 contains λk(wk)2 =
n∑
i=1
f
(2)
1 (0)
2!
(
xki
)2
from Pk and λklwk·wl =
n∑
i=1
f
(2)
1 (0)
2! x
k
i · xli
from Pk, Pl.
To build the global model, the derived w¯ satisfies ε-
differential privacy regarding to D by applying Algorithm
1. For P1, ∆1f = d +
d1(2d−d1)
4 . For Pk(k 6= 1), ∆kf =
dk + d
k(2d−dk)
4 . Algorithm 1 achieves (
∆1f
∆f
ε)-differential
privacy regarding to D1 and (
∆kf
∆f
ε)-differential privacy re-
garding to Dk. When P1 shares label with other parties,
P1 has (d − d1) more sensitivity, and ∆kf for other parties
does not change as the label y ∈ {0, 1} does not change
|( f
(1)
1 (0)
1! − y)| = 12 .
Extension to the Bottom-up Case
So far, we have discussed the framework from the top-down
case, where the server selects the privacy budget to achieve
on the whole dataset and informs the parties the scale of
noise based on the global sensitivity of objective function.
We can also achieve differential privacy from the bottom-up
case, where each party selects the level of differential pri-
vacy ε(k) they want to achieve for their sub-dataset and the
server adjusts ε accordingly. In practice, the choice between
top-down and bottom-up approaches depends on the agree-
ment between server and parties.
In the bottom-up case, each party Pk splits their privacy
budget ε(k) onto sending λkφ and λ
k∗
φ in a differentially pri-
vate manner, i.e. ε(k) = εk +
∑K
l=1 ε
kl, where εk is the
privacy budget for λkφ, and ε
kl is the privacy budget for
λklφ ⊂ λk∗φ . Pk and Pl jointly decide εkl. The sensitivity of
λkφ is ∆
k
g = 2 max
t
∑J
j=1
∑
φ∈Φkj ||λ
k
φt||1. The sensitivity
of λklφ is ∆
kl
h = 2 maxt
∑J
j=1
∑
φ∈Φklj ||λ
kl
φt||1.
Corollary 1. The global model achieves ε-differential pri-
vacy regarding to D in the bottom-up case, where
ε =
K∑
k=1
∆f
∆kg
εk +
∑
1≤k,l≤K
∆f
∆klh
εkl.
Discussion
The objective of our work is to preserve differential privacy
for regression models trained on vertically partitioned data.
We have theoretical proofs (Theorems 1 and 2 ) that our al-
gorithm guarantees to satisfy differential privacy. We protect
Table 2: Mean square error of linear regression on synthetic datasets under different sparsity s (δ = 1n for DPFW, ε = 1)
s non-private DPFW-C DPFW-2 DPFW-4 DPFW-8 FM
0.1 0.0033±0.0101 0.5487±0.1907 1.2980±0.4537 2.2719±0.7423 4.6538±2.0663 0.0035±0.0107
0.5 0.0052±0.0157 40.392±5.132 85.264±10.560 164.95±19.60 338.16±31.41 0.0058±0.0174
1.0 0.0050±0.0154 271.09±27.75 638.66±59.70 1206.4±66.2 2441.0±174.2 0.0056±0.0172
Table 3: Classification accuracy of logistic regression on Adult and Dutch datasets under different privacy budget ε
ε
Adult Dutch
non-private DPSGD FM non-private DPSGD FM
0.1
0.8368±0.0029
0.6000±0.0738 0.6412±0.1463
0.8303±0.0040
0.5060±0.0684 0.5783±0.0572
1 0.6956±0.0229 0.7315±0.0379 0.6867±0.0373 0.7166±0.0489
10 0.8023±0.0071 0.8132±0.0231 0.8003±0.0182 0.8105±0.0086
differential privacy of the whole training data such that at-
tackers cannot derive the presence or absence of any single
record (with all feature values and label) in the training data
from the released jointly-learnt regression model (as shown
in Theorem 1). As training data is vertically split into K
parties, we further show in Theorem 2 each party k also
achieves differential privacy against attackers regarding to
its own data Dk.
Our contribution is that we add less noise than state-of-
the-art approaches to achieve the same level of differential
privacy, e.g., our approach reduces noise addition by a mag-
nitude of the number of total iterations compared with gradi-
ent perturbation approaches. Furthermore, the secure vector
computation also protects the disclosure of raw data between
the server and the participating parties. We use the standard
secure vector multiplication under the semi-honest model in
our framework. The number of inner products in our algo-
rithm is bounded by d2.
Experiments
We evaluate our proposed framework of achieving differ-
ential privacy in vertically partitioned multiparty learning
based on functional mechanism (FM) for linear regression
and logistic regression.
Experiment Setup
Dataset. For linear regression, we evaluate on US and
Brazil (IPUMS 2009) datasets. US has 370,000 records
and 14 features and Brazil has 190,000 and 14 features.
We also evaluate on three synthetic datasets that are sparse
and high dimensional. All three synthetic datasets have
80,000 records and 800 features and their sparsity values
are s = 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, respectively. The sparsity here is
both the ratio of nonzero entries in datasets and the ratio
of non-zero ground-truth parameters. For logistic regres-
sion, we evaluate on Adult (Dheeru and Taniskidou 2017)
and Dutch (Zliobaite, Kamiran, and Calders 2011) datasets.
Adult has 45,222 samples and 41 features and Dutch has
60,420 records and 36 features. We split each dataset into
80% training data and 20% testing data. We replicate exper-
iment for 10 times and report mean and standard deviation.
Baseline. For linear regression, we compare with the non-
private linear regression and DPFW (Lou and Cheung 2018).
DPFW achieves (ε, δ)-differential privacy and has two ver-
sions, DPFW-C in the centralized setting and DPFW-K
in the multiparty setting. We specify the number of par-
ties K=2,4,8 in our comparison. For logistic regression,
we compare with the non-private logistic regression and
DPSGD (Song, Chaudhuri, and Sarwate 2013). DPSGD
adds Laplace noise onto gradients for each iteration. DPSGD
does not apply to multiparty setting.
We evaluate utility of linear regression by mean square
error (MSE) and utility of logistic regression by accuracy.
Linear Regression
For linear regression, we first evaluate our method on two
real-world datasets. Table 1 shows the results on US and
Brazil datasets under different values (0.1, 1, 10) of privacy
budget ε. We set δ = 1n for DPFW. Our FM method satisfies
(ε, 0)-differential privacy whereas DPFW satisfies (ε, δ)-
differential privacy. So our FM method is more restricted in
terms of privacy protection. However, our FM method still
significantly outperforms DPFW with much smaller MSE
under the settings of all three ε values for both datasets,
as shown in Table 1. In fact, the utility of our method is
very close to the non-private linear regression even when ε
is small. For example, our FM achieves the MSE of 0.0070
when ε = 0.1 for Brazil data, which is very close to 0.0044
from non-private linear regression.
We then evaluate our method on high dimensional syn-
thetic datasets (d = 800). Table 2 shows the results on syn-
thetic datasets under different sparsity s. We set ε = 1 for
FM and ε = 1, δ = 1n for DPFW. DPFW is designed to
work for high dimensional and sparse data. As shown in
2, DPFW works well with satisfactory MSE values when
s = 0.1 but has very poor utility with large MSE when
s = 0.5, 1.0. On the contrary, our FM method works con-
sistently well across all three datasets as the FM mecha-
nism does not depend on data sparsity. We emphasize even
with s = 0.1, our FM method incurs much smaller MSE
(2 or 3 orders of magnitude less) than DPFW. Moreover,
our method preserves strict (ε, 0)-differential privacy while
DPFW preserves (ε, 1n )-differential privacy. Because our
method achieves the same utility in the decentralized setting
as in the centralized setting, MSE does not change along
with the number of participating parties K. On contrast,
DPFW incurs more utility loss as K increases.
Logistic Regression
For logistic regression, we evaluate our method on two real-
world datasets. Table 3 shows the results on Adult and
Dutch datasets under different privacy budget ε. DPSGD
adds Laplace noise onto gradients for each iteration, so the
total amount of noise added into the model increases pro-
portionally with the number of iterations. On the contrary,
our FM only adds noise to the objective function and only
adds once. As shown in Table 3, the utility of our method
is much better than DPSGD. Moreover, DPSGD cannot ap-
ply to the multiparty setting while our method is applicable
and independent of K. We also would like to point out that,
compared to linear regression, the utility of FM is worse as
privacy budget decreases. This is because the order-2 Taylor
expansion approximation is biased to the original objective
function.
Conclusions and Future Work
We proposed a new framework for differential privacy pre-
serving multiparty learning in the vertically partitioned set-
ting based on the functional mechanism. In the framework,
the server dissects the objective function into single-party
and cross-party sub-functions and rewrite them in the poly-
nomial form. For the coefficients in the polynomial form
related to one single party, they can be calculated by each
party. For those coefficients related to two or multiple par-
ties, we apply secure vector multiplication. To achieve dif-
ferential privacy, the parties add noise to the coefficients
according to global sensitivity and send noisy coefficients
back to server. The server then solves the perturbed objective
function and releases the private model. Our method needs
only one round of noise addition and secure aggregation.
The released model in our framework achieves the same util-
ity as applying the functional mechanism in the centralized
setting. Our evaluation on real-world and synthetic datasets
for linear and logistic regressions shows the effectiveness of
our proposed method.
In our framework, we proposed the use of the BGN
doubly homomorphic encryption algorithm for secure inner
product calculation. Secure calculation is the bottleneck of
our framework as the noise addition of achieving differential
privacy via functional mechanism is insignificant in terms of
computation and communication cost. In our experiment, we
mainly evaluated accuracy of regression models on varying
numbers of parties K (the number of features owned by a
party when evenly distributed is d/K). Our theoretical anal-
ysis also showed that our algorithm can achieve the same
accuracy as the centralized private model regardless of the
number of parties. In our future work, we will evaluate per-
formance due to the change of the number of features and
study the performance overhead of BGN.
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